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THE RIGHT
JOHN E. TEAGAN*
A recent case' decided by the National Labor Relations Board
has to some extent clarified the Board's views relating to the right of an
employer to close its plant when the reasons therefor are partly eco-
nomic and partly due to its employees' union activities. In that de-
cision the Board held:
Moreover, even assuming as Respondent contends, that the
six genuine economic factors as well as the employees' union
activities were responsible for the closing of the mill, Darling-
ton's action was no less unlawful. A plant shutdown result-
ing in the discharge of employees that is partly due to em-
ployees' union activities constitutes an unfair labor practice.
At this point we reach the fundamental issue noted above—
whether an employer has the absolute right to go out of busi-
ness even if its reason for doing so is employees' activities.
Section 8(a) (3) provides:
it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . .
by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employ-
ment or any term or condition of employment to encour-
age or discourage membership in any labor organization. 2
The evidence, as interpreted by the Board, left no doubt that
Darlington decided to dissolve because the Textile Workers Union of
America had been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as
the collective bargaining agent in the mill. Prior to and during the
organizing campaign, Darlington was engaged in an extensive plant im-
provement program involving an expenditure of $400,000 in a nine-
month period. However, just one month before the decision to close the
mill was made, the manager reported a projected loss of $40,000. After
the conclusion of the election which the union won and the discon-
tinuance of the renovation program, the directors met and voted to
recommend closing the mill. Upon the adjournment of the directors'
meeting, which lasted just over an hour, the supervisors told the em-
ployees that the election was the cause of the mill shutdown. The Board
found that at a subsequent stockholders' meeting, President Milli-
* LL.B. 1929, Suffolk University; Associated with the firm of Morgan, Brown,
Kearns & Joy of Boston; former Vice President of the New England Power Service
Company and Labor Relations Counsel for the New England Electric System; Member
of the Massachusetts and Federal Bars.
Darlington Mfg. Co. & Textile Workers of America, A.F.L.-C.I.O., 139 N.L.R.B.
No. 23, 51 L.R.R.M. 1278 (1962). The company has filed a petition for review with the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
2 51 L.R.R.M. at 1280.
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ken specifically stated that he had decided to close the mill when
the employees selected the union as their bargaining agent.8 In its
brief the company made its most damaging admission by conced-
ing that the election was responsible for its decision to call the meeting
at which it was decided to recommend liquidation to the stockholders.
The following defenses, among others, were rejected by the Board:
(1) That the shutting of the mill "effectively and finally terminated"
the existing employer-employee relationship and thereafter, it was not
an employer within the meaning of the act; (2) that the South Caro-
lina statutes under which it had incorporated gave it the "absolute right
to liquidate."'
Prior to the Darlington decision, there were several Board and
court cases which would, at first glance, lead to the conclusion that if
there were justifiable economic reasons for closing or moving a plant,
such action would not be a violation of section 8(a) (3), 3 even though it
was partly motivated by the employees' union activities. Those cases
were either distinguished from Darlington or overruled.
In Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB,6 the Board found that the
company had moved its plant in order to avoid negotiations with a
union which had just won a representation election. In reversing the
Board the Fourth Circuit found that the employees' union activities
merely accentuated the employer's pre-existing lawful reasons for mov-
ing its plant, and that the move was motivated by factors apart from its
employees' union activities. In Darlington, the Board held that the
company itself distinguished Mount Hope by conceding that the closing
of the Darlington mill was partly attributable to the employees' selec-
tion of the union. In other words, in Mount Hope the plant would have
moved for economic reasons, and the presence of anti-union motivation
was a coincidental and additional factor; in Darlington the anti-union
motivation was a substantial part of the decision to close the mill.'
The Board found more difficulty in distinguishing NLRB v. New
Madrid Co.s There the court said that an employer does have the ab-
solute right, at all times, to go out of business, " . . . for whatever
reason he may choose, whether union animosity or anything else. . . .
No one can be required to stay in private business . . . . And the
Act affords no basis on which to order a person to reinstate employees
in a business which he has with plain finality put out of existence." 9




5 LMRA, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1958).
6
 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954).
7 51 L.R.R.M. at 1280 n.16.
8
 215 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1954).
9
 Id. at 914.
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interpreted its holding as being contrary to the court's obiter dictum,
and found that the statutory right of an employer to dose a plant
permanently was not there in issue. Moreover, even if the company
(Darlington) had correctly interpreted the court's meaning, the Board
declined to follow it." The Board appears to have discounted the fact
that in NLRB v. Missouri Transit 1' the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its
decision in New Madrid, and quoted at length from it, saying:
Had the Board in the instant case ordered the respondent to
reinstate the drivers in the lines it had sold, and over which
respondent no longer had any control, we would consider our
decision in New Madrid controlling."
In addition to a violation of section 8(a) (3), it was found that
Darlington's threat to close its mill if the union became the bargaining
representative of its employees was a classic example of a violation of
section 8(a) (1), 13 and that its refusal to furnish the union with wage
and related bargaining information independently violated section8 (a)( 5). 1.4
Overruling the trial examiner, the Board awarded back pay as
essential to rectify Darlington's violation of section 8(a) (3), and
ordered the company to provide back pay until the discharged em-
ployees were able to obtain substantially equivalent employment." In
a footnote, however, the Board stated that "If . the employees are
placed on a preferential hiring list at other Deering-Milliken [the
parent corporation] mills, we shall toll back pay as of the time they
are placed on such list.""
I° 51 L.R.R.M. at 1281-82.
11 250 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1957).
12 Id. at 264.
13 51 L.R.R.M. at 1282.
14 Id. at 1283.
15 Id. at 1284.
16 Id. at 1284 n.44. The Board would normally have awarded reinstatement, with back
pay being also given up to the time reinstatement was offered. Because it was fairly certain
that Darlington would not reopen, the Board ordered:
It is therefore possible that even in the event Darlington does not resume its
operations, so as to enable the discharged employees to be reinstated there, the
job rights of these discharged employees may still be afforded a measure of pro-
tection. We direct, therefore, that in the event the Darlington plant is not re-
opened, Deering-Milliken shall offer employment to the discharged employees,
if they desire, in its other mills in South Carolina or adjacent states, without
prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges to the extent that
positions are available in such plants. Id. at 1286.
It is significant that the Board included the following in its order:
However, in order not to injure innocent third persons presently employed in the
other mills, we shall not require that such persons be dismissed or otherwise
prejudiced in order to carry out the reinstatement ordered herein. Any remain-
ing discharged employee for whom no work in available . . . shall be placed upon
a preferential hiring list. . .
We shall also order the respondent Deering-Milliken to offer to pay employees
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Again overruling the trial examiner, the Board held that because
of common ownership, control and exercise of control by the Milliken
family over labor relations, sales, tax matters, insurance, purchasing
and engineering, Deering-Milliken and its affiliated corporations in-
cluding Darlington constituted a single employer responsible for the un-
fair labor practices committed by Darlington (including back pay).
Deering-Milliken was thus ordered to bargain with the union for
the purpose of reaching an agreement as to the mode of operation of
the preferential hiring lists, and as to the terms and conditions under
which the former employees of Darlington Mills may, if they desire,
obtain employment at other mills in South Carolina and adjacent states.
Member Leedom dissented on two points. He felt that Deering-
Milliken and its affiliates did not occupy a single employer status with
Darlington and would have dismissed the complaint as to them."
Further, he would award back pay only from the date of discrimina-
tion to the date when Darlington closed its plant—not until the dis-
charged employees found substantially equivalent jobs elsewhere."
Member Rodgers, while agreeing that Darlington violated section
8(a) ( I), dissented for the following reasons. The burden of proof as to
whether Deering-Milliken and its affiliated corporations constituted a
single employer rested upon the General Counsel and it was not met. 19
Moreover, he found no violation of section 8(a) (3), observing that
"there is nothing contained in the basic Act or amendments thereto,
which limits an employer's right to go out of business at such time and
under such circumstances as he chooses."'
In Mount Hope,' the Fourth Circuit considered a closely anal-
ogous situation. There the company had been considering the removal
of operations to the South because of unfavorable business conditions.
Two days after the union won a representation election, the President
of Mount Hope "gave an interview to the press indicating that the
plant would close permanently in thirty days, and that management
could and would no longer stand the economic and financial pressures
incited by the union."'" The court said that "it was obvious to the
company that if it could not make a go of the business prior to 1951,
before the union was formed, it would be no better able to succeed after
the pressure of the union was added to its existing difficulties. . . "23
the travel and moving expenses entailed in moving their families and household
effects to other mills in the event employees accept such offers or reinstatement.
Id.
17 Id. at 1287.
18 Ibid.
19 Id. at 1287-88.
29 Id. at 1288.
21 Supra note 6.
22
 Id. at 370.
23 Id. at 372.
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Moreover, the court pointed out that "the union was doubtless aware
of the fact . . . that the company, having committed no unfair labor
practice had the undoubted right to decide unilaterally and without
consultation with the union to close its plant for economic reasons and
to endeavor to save some of its investment."'
Contrary to the statement of the Board in Darlington, it would
seem that the employees' union activity in Mount Hope actually was a
motivating cause of management's decision to close the plant. The only
real difference between Mount Hope and Darlington is that in the latter
the company refused to bargain, while in the former it declined in good
faith to recognize the union without an election since the union's ma-
jority status and the eligibility of working foremen were in doubt. Yet,
after the union election, Mount Hope did sit down with the union and
engage in discussion. It is difficult, therefore, in view of the state-
ment of Mount Hope's President, to understand the Board's position in
Darlington—that Mount Hope's decision to move its plant was moti-
vated by factors apart from its employees' union activity. 25
In Darlington the trial examiner found that the mill would not
have closed but for the employees' union activity. The Board stated
that the trial examiner's finding gave rise to the presumption that Dar-
lington would have continued to operate absent that union activity.'
Both statements are pure conjecture and lack one shred of evidence to
support them. Furthermore, insofar as Darlington was found to have
violated section 8 (a)(3), such finding could not have been made with-
out speculation as to whether the plant would have remained in opera-
tion in the absence of union activity.
The fact that Darlington had spent $400,000 on plant improve-
ment during the nine month period preceeding the election is not in-
consistent with a poor financial condition. It is a fact of business life
that improved machinery and equipment are necessary under present
day conditions to meet competition. The report by the general manager
of a projected loss of $40,000 is consistent with the conclusion that
Darlington faced severe financial problems.
The holding of the Board that "a plant shutdown resulting in the
discharge of employees that is partly due to employees' union activities
constitutes an unfair labor practice," 27 is inconsistent with its statement
that "There is no decided case directly dispositive of Darlington's claim
that it had an absolute right to close its mill, irrespective of motive.'
The case which the Board cites as authority for the former proposition
24 Id. at 374.
25
 Supra note 7.
26 51 L.R.R.M. at 1284 n.38.
27 Id. at 1280, citing NLRB v. Jamestown Sterling Corp., 211 F.2d 725 (2d Cir.
1954).
26 Id. at 1282.
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involved discharge of employees partly because of their participation in
a union campaign and partly because of some "absenteeism" and
"visiting."29
 It is difficult to see how this case supports the Board's
conclusion.
Deering-Milliken and its affiliated corporations, including Darling-
ton, were found to constitute a single employer because of the common
ownership and control of Darlington and Deering-Milliken. In so hold-
ing the Board appears to have departed from its own unanimous deci-
sion in Printing Pressman's Union & Knight Newspapers, Inc.," a
secondary boycott case, wherein it held that "Notwithstanding the fact
of single ownership, the potentiality of common control and integrated
operation is not a sufficient basis to support a finding of a single
employer." In that case Knight Newspapers, which operated the De-
troit Free Press, was parent of the corporation owning and publishing
the Miami Herald. It exercised almost complete control of Miami
Herald—yet the Board refused to find them one employer.
It is surprising that the Board did not mention Walter C. Phillips,
Regional Director v. Burlington Indus. Inc.,' which involved a peti-
tion by the Regional Director for a temporary injunction prohibiting
an employer from liquidating his plant. The petition was denied since
injunctive relief would have been futile. The court observed that "It
cannot be said from the record that the decision to close the plant was
not influenced at least in part, by defendant's necessity to recognize the
union. It is undisputed that the plant was losing money!"32 It then
quoted from NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, wherein the Second Circuit
stated: 33
If in fact the . . . employer . . . was opposed to unioniza-
tion and if in fact, it was actually losing money, the mere fact,
if shown, that the unionization with its consequent increase
in costs was a material factor in its decision to liquidate would
not affect the case. As stated in Jay's Foods, Inc. v. NLRB
. . . {292 F.2d 317, 320 (7th Cir. 1961)] :
An employer has a right to consider objectively and in-
dependently economic impact of unionization of its shop
and to manage the business accordingly, and fundamen-
tally, if he makes a change in operations because of rea-
sonably anticipated increased costs, regardless of whether
they are caused by or contributed to by the advent of
union or some other factor, his action does not constitute
20 NLRB v. Jamestown Sterling Corp., supra note 27.
30 138 N.L.R.B. 137, 51 L.R.R.M. 1169 (1962).
31 199 F. Supp. 589 (N.D. Ga. 1961).
32 Id. at 591.
33 Id. at 592, citing 293 F.2d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 1961).
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discrimination within Section 8(a)(1), (3) or (5) of the
Act.
The Burlington court held that it had no authority under the law to
require the restoration of some 600 employees already discharged. It
noted that an injunction in these circumstances would be without legal
precedent.
The Darlington decision was dated November 13, 1962. On the
same day, the First Circuit handed down its decision in NLRB v. New
England Web, Inc.," overruling the Board and agreeing with the trial
examiner to the effect that the company had a right to liquidate its
business. There the court said: 35
We start with the proposition that a businessman still retains
the untrammeled prerogative to close his enterprise when, in
the exercise of a legitimate and justified business judgment,
he concludes that such a step is either economically desirable
or economically necessary. This prerogative exists quite apart
from whether or not there is a union on the scene.
`The advent of the union was a new economic factor which
necessarily had to be evaluated by the respondent as a part of
the overall picture pertaining to costs or operation.' . .
[NLRB v. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781, 783 (6th Cir. 1960)]
Certainly the company could reasonably expect the advent
of the union to affect its already precarious cost picture. . . .
Again, in the language of the Court in Lassing, supra:
`It is completely unrealistic in the field of business to say that
management is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably in chang-
ing its method of operation based on reasonably anticipated
increases in costs, instead of waiting until such increased costs
actually materializes.'
In NLRB v. Kingsford," the Sixth Circuit reversed a Board find-
ing that the employer's "predominant motive" for closing his shop was
discriminatory and in violation of sections 8(a) (1) and (3). The court
observed that the Board's finding was not supported by "substantial
evidence" and described the problem as follows:
. . . In a case such as this, the task of determining motiva-
tion is truly difficult, when the employer advances economic
reasons of any substance as that which brings about the
34 51 L.R.R.M. 2426 (1st Cir. 1962).
3' Id. at 2430-31.
Bo 52 L.R.R.M. 2555 (6th Cir. 1963).
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change. Indeed, the problem is intensified by the obviously
true proposition that the employer is free to make bad busi-
ness judgments without contravening the Act, even though
there is a resultant loss of employment. It is not the wisdom
or business acumen reflected by the change, which is deter-
minative of whether there is a violation. It is the predominant
motive behind the change. . . . Where there is no apparent
reason for the change, the employer's claim of economic moti-
vation is obviously suspect and if inferences may be reason-
ably drawn from the evidence that the requisite illegal
motivation was predominant in effecting the change, the
Board's decision must stand. [Emphasis supplied.]
However, animosity toward the union is an insufficient basis
for an inference that the employer's motive for change is
illegal under the Act where there is convincing evidence that
the change was economically motivated.37
Because of its complicated factual situation and the variety of
issues involved, Darlington may perhaps not be the best case from
which to analyze and define the basic issues involved in a company's
decision to close down or liquidate its business. And in the light of New
Madrid, Mount Hope and New England Web, which have recognized
that the advent of the union is a new economic factor which a company
may supposedly evaluate and take into account in deciding to close
down, the Board's decision will have rough going in the courts when
enforcement is sought." The ultimate question then, which still awaits
final clarification, is to what extent is an employer obliged to present
and document the economic justification of his decision to dissolve.
37 Id. at 2558-59.
38 Cf. NLRB v. Preston Feed Corp., 309 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1962), discussed in
Comment, Recent Developments in Labor Law, p. 671 infra. [Editor's note.]
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